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COMMENTS
CIVIL PROCEDURE- APPEALABILITY OF AN ORDER GRANTING
60 (b) MOTION IN COLORADO - TRIAL COURT

OR DENYING A RULE
ABUSED

ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO SET ASIDE A DEFAULT

JUDGMENT. -

Coerber v. Rath, 435 P.2d

228

(Colo. 1967).

Plaintiff Rath obtained a default judgment against the defendants on a claim arising out of the alleged tortious conduct of the
defendant Charles Coerber, an employee of defendant Carl Coerber,
while Charles was in the act of repossessing plaintiff's automobile.
The default judgment was entered for failure of the defendants to
answer certain interrogatories submitted by the plaintiffs. The trial
court refused to vacate the default judgment, and defendants filed
a writ of error in the Colorado Supreme Court. On review of the
district court's refusal to set aside the default judgment, held, reversed
and remanded; in view of the gross neglect of defendants' counsel,
the trial court abused its discretion.'
The general policy of the law is to permit an appeal only from
a final decision or judgment. 2 It is the purpose of this Comment to
determine whether or not an order by a Colorado district court setting aside, or refusing to set aside, a judgment pursuant to rule 60 (b),
Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure,' is itself a final judgment and
reviewable.
The decisions of the federal courts-"if the plaintiff's motion
is within the ambit of rule 60 (b) [Federal Rules of Civil Procedure],
the denial of the motion is a final appealable judgment" 4 - reflects
the disposition of the majority of jurisdictions in the United States.5
Contrary to this position, Colorado decisions since Green v. Thatcher6
and prior to Coerber have consistently held that an order granting or
denying relief from a default judgment is not in itself a final judgment, 7 and that a "writ of error will not lie from a ruling subse1

Coerber v. Rath, 435 P.2d 228 (Colo. 1967).
24 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and Error § 50 (1962).
3 Rule 60(b) provides in part: "On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court
may relieve a party... from a final judgment ....
"
4Woodham v. American Cystoscope Co., 335 F.2d 551, 554 (5th Cir. 1964) ; accord,
Greear v. Greear, 288 F.2d 466, 467 (9th Cir. 1961).

PRACTICE ff 55.09 (2d ed. 1966).
5
See Annot., 8 A.L.R. 3d 1272 (1966).
8 31 Colo. 363, 72 P. 1078 (1903).
7 Emanuel v. Fielding, 31 Colo. 440, 441, 72 P. 1079 (1903).
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quently entered refusing to modify or change the final decree.' ' The
significance of the Coerber decision is that the Colorado Supreme
Court accepted defendants' petition for writ of error to an order of
the district court denying the defendants' motion to vacate the
default judgment.
Two recent Colorado Supreme Court decisions are helpful in
interpreting the court's inconsistent action in Coerber. In General
Aluminum Corp. v. Arapahoe County District Court,9 the district
court issued an order granting the defendant's motion to vacate a
default judgment. The supreme court, refusing to review the lower
court's order, held that "the only proper procedure to secure review
of a trial court's order granting an application to set aside a default
judgment is by writ of error after final judgment."' The language
of the court indicates that the granting of a motion to set aside a
default judgment is not a final judgment in Colorado and is not
subject to review.
The district court in Henritze v. Borden Company, " denied
a rule 60(b) motion to set aside a judgment. Although the supreme
court refused to reverse the decision of the lower court, because of
the failure of Henritze to show a meritorious defense, it is significant
that the court did review the record and particularly Henritze's
2
motion to vacate.1
A possible explanation for the court's decision in Henritze is
that the judgment itself and not the refusal of the district court to
set the judgment aside was at issue. This explanation is not possible
in Coerber.
In Colorado, a writ of error may be issued to any final judgment,
provided that it is issued within 3 months of the entry of the judgment. 13 The writ of error in Henritze was timely with respect to the
judgment entered by the district court and also with respect to that
court's denial of the defendant's motion to have the judgment set
aside. In Coerber, the default judgment was entered August 24, 1966,
the denial of the motion to set aside the default judgment was entered
October 7, 1966, and the writ of error was issued December 9, 1966.11
Although the writ of error was issued more than 3 months after entry
of the default judgment, it was issued within 3 months of the court's
8

McMullin v. Denver, 133 Colo. 297, 300, 294 P.2d 918, 919 (1956) ; accord, First
Nat'l Bank v. Follett, 46 Colo. 452, 457, 104 P. 954, 956 (1909) ; Green v. Thatcher,

31 Colo. 363, 364, 72 P. 1078 (1903).
9 439 P.2d 340 (Colo. 1968).
10

Id. at 341 (emphasis added).
11432 P.2d 2 (Colo. 1967).

12 Id.
13 COLo. R. Civ. P. 111(b).

14Record, vol. 3, Coerber v. Rath, 435 P.2d 228 (Colo. 1967).
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denial of the Coerbers' 60(b) motion. Since rule 6(b) prohibits the
Colorado Supreme Court from extending the period in which a writ
of error may be sued out,' 5 the court's ruling in Coerber must have
concerned the district court's denial of the defendants' 60 (b) motion.
In Coerber, the court's language referring to the gross neglect
of defendants' counsel- "unusual, shameful and difficult situation
• . . [hjopefully ... one that will never be repeated'6 - may indicate that the case was decided on an ad hoc basis. More than one-third
of the opinion discussed in detail the gross neglect of the Coerbers'
attorney. The holding of the court was that, under the circumstances,
the trial court had abused its discretion in refusing to set aside the
default judgment. However, when considered with Henritze, it becomes doubtful that the decision in Coerber was reached only to
avoid injustice in one particular case. The language in Henritze 'we have reviewed the record and particularly
Henritze's motion to
7
vacate" - lends strong support to the assertion that the supreme
court would have reversed the district court's denial of the 60(b)
motion had Henritze shown as meritorious a defense as did the
defendants in Coerber.
The most logical interpretation of the Coerber decision is that
the supreme court, in modifying the Thatcher line of decisions, ruled
that an order by a lower court denying a motion to set aside a judgment pursuant to rule 60 (b) is a final judgment and subject to review.
However, the court in Henritze and Coerber has not abandoned its
attitude that the lower court's decision "will not be disturbed on review unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion.''18 The holdings
of the court in the two cases indicate that such clear abuse of discretion will be found where (1) the defendant alleges a meritorious
defense, (2) the plaintiff will not be thereby prejudiced, (3) a writ
of error can no longer be filed to the final judgment, and (4) substantial justice will be done by reversing the lower court's order.'
The results of a ruling that an order denying a 60(b) motion
is a final reviewable judgment are dichotomous. This divergence
necessarily results from a clash of the two principles that litigation
must terminate within a reasonable time, but that justice must be
accorded the parties. 20 Rule 60(b) provides for operation of relief
15 COLO. R. Civ. P. 6(b).
16435 P.2d at 228.
17 432 P.2d at 2.
18 4 V. DITTMAN, COLORADO PRACTICE

§ 60.5 (1966).

19 Coerber v. Rath, 435 P.2d 228, 232 (Colo. 1967) ; Henritze v. Borden Co., 432 P.2d
2 (Colo. 1967).
20

See Moore & Rogers, Federal Relief From Civil Judgments, 55

YALE

UJ. 623 (1946).
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where there is "any ...reason justifying relief from the operation of
the [final] judgment" provided that the motion is made within a
reasonable time or, in some cases, within 6 months after final judgment. 1 Since a writ of error must be issued within 3 months of final
judgment,2 2 it is apparent that, prior to Coerber, after 3 months had
expired, the right to review was lost, even though relief in the trial
court under 60(b) was not yet foreclosed. By adopting the federal
interpretation concerning reviewability of an order denying relief
from a default judgment, Coerber has extended the period within
which litigation will terminate. However, by deciding that the lower
court's order denying a rule 60(b) motion is a final reviewable judgment as defined by the Colorado rules 23 the supreme court has afforded a party who has a meritorious defense the opportunity to
obtain substantial justice when it is obvious that the trial court has
abused its discretion in denying the motion to set aside the judgment.
Dennis J. Falk
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Mathis v.

United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968).
Defendant Mathis was serving a prison sentence in the Florida
State Prison for a conviction unrelated to tax charges. While a
prisoner, a regular agent1 of the Internal Revenue Service elicited from
Mathis documents and oral statements concerning tax returns previously made by Mathis. Mathis was not advised "that any evidence
he gave the Government could be used against him, and that he
had a right to remain silent if he desired as well as a right to the
presence of counsel and that if he was unable to afford counsel one
would be appointed for him.''2 Suspecting fraud, the regular agent
referred the case to the Intelligence Division of the Internal Revenue
Service. When agents of the Intelligence Division contacted Mathis,
he was advised of his rights. At his trial, Mathis, relying solely on
Miranda v. Arizona,3 sought to suppress the documents and statements
arguing (1) that throughout the investigation there was a possibility
21

COLO. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
rule 111 (b).
23 Id. rule 111(a) (1).
221d.

I A regular agent is an Internal Revenue Service agent concerned with civil tax audits
as opposed to a special agent of the Intelligence Division of the Internal Revenue
Service concerned primarily with criminal investigations of tax fraud and evasion. See
H. BALTER, TAX FRAUD AND EVASION §§ 3.3, 3.3-1, 3.3-2 (3d ed. 1963).
2
Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1, 2-3 (1968).
3 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

